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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAMDAR & COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 900539-CA
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR.,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

I.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The facts necessary to resolve whether the Utah courts can
assert specific personal jurisdiction over Laray Co., James A.
Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal (hereinafter collectively referred to
as "Laray1") are not in dispute.
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In sum, for over 18 years

The contacts that Laray Co. has to Utah parallels those of
James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal. While Laray & Co. required
corporate tax and financial services and James A. Boal, Jr. and
Raymond Boal required personal tax and accounting services, the
contacts with the state of Utah are virtually the same. All the
appellees contracted with Kamdar & Co. on a yearly basis. All
appellees sent their tax and other financial information to Kamdar
& Co. in Utah. All the appellees had many telephone calls and
written correspondences with Kamdar & Co. in Utah regarding the
accomplishment of these services. All the appellees paid for these
services to Kamdar & Co. on a yearly contractual basis. All of the
appellees terminated the services of Kamdar & Co. at the end of the

Kamdar & Co. was Laray1s accounting division.

Yet, rather than

having its accounting division down the hall from its corporate
offices, Laray chose to have its accounting division in Utah.
Now, Laray has refused to pay Kamdar & Co. for services it
rendered to Laray in 1987 and 1988.
Kamdar & Co. has been located in Utah since 1971. All
accounting services rendered for Laray by Kamdar & Co. have been
performed in Utah (See R.3,77&78).

To enable Kamdar & Co. to

perform these services, each year Laray has delivered to Kamdar &
Co. all of its financial books and records to Kamdar & Co. in
Utah.

(See R. 62,64,65,77478).

Each year, Laray has telephoned

and sent written correspondence to Kamdar & Co. in Utah regarding
these very services.

(See R.62,64,65&78).

Accordingly, from 1971 until 1988, Laray hired Kamdar & Co.
on a yearly basis for these services.
on a yearly basis.

These services were paid

Even the termination of Kamdar & Co.'s

services took place at the end of a year.

Each year Laray chose

to renew its contract to hire Kamdar & Co., a Utah company, to
perform its tax needs.

At the beginning of any given year, it

last yearly contractual arrangement. Accordingly, throughout the
appellant's briefing on this matter, references to Laray's contacts
are equally applicable to an analysis required to find specific
personal jurisdiction over James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal
individually.
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could have chosen to do otherwise.
In specific part, Laray came to Utah in 1987 and 1988 to
have its accounting services performed by Kamdar & Co.

Yet now

it wishes to avoid coming to Utah to explain why it refused to
pay for these very services.

This position fails as a matter of

law.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Laray Has Failed To Make The Distinction Between Specific
Personal Jurisdiction And General Personal Jurisdiction.
Laray is living in the past.

The Utah cases cited in its

brief arguing that the Utah courts lack personal jurisdiction
over it are inapplicable.

Each case cited by Laray pre-dates

Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978),
where Utah Supreme Court specifically articulated the necessary
distinction between specific personal jurisdiction and general
personal jurisdiction.

See also Roskellev & Co. v. Larco. Inc..

610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980).

Prior to the Abbott opinion, the Utah

courts had applied the "doing business test" in determining
whether either specific or general personal jurisdiction should
be extended over a non-resident.

The Abbott opinion abandoned

this approach and adopted the modern federal analysis that
required a distinction be made as a threshold matter between
general and specific jurisdictions.
3

The recognition by the Utah courts of this distinction was
succinctly addressed by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah in Nova Mudd Corp, v. L. H. Fletcher. 648 F.Supp
1123 (D. Utah 1986).

In Nova Mudd. the court specifically

itemized some of these earlier Utah cases which have little
practical value in determining specific personal jurisdiction
because of the failure to make a distinction between specific and
general jurisdiction altogether.

These itemized cases included

United Ski Co. v. Union Plastic Corp.. 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976)
and Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co.. 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976).
These two cases are two of the three central cases cited by Laray
in support of its position that the court should not exercise
jurisdiction over it.

The third case cited by Laray, White v.

Arthur Murray. Inc.. 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976), similarly fails to
distinguish between specific and general personal jurisdiction.
The only other case cited by Laray in support of its position is
the Hill v. Zale Corp.. 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971)
in which the Utah Supreme Court specifically delineated factors
relevant to the "doing business test."

This entire argument and

the use of these cases is inapplicable to the resolution of the
present dispute.
In the present case, Kamdar & Co. does not claim that Laray
is subject to the court's general jurisdictional authority.
4

Rather, Kamdar & Co. asserts that Laray is subject to the court's
specific personal jurisdiction authority.

Thus, the application

of the "doing business" rule is improper.

As a result, the

affidavits proffered by Laray which alleges that it does not own
property in Utah, has no accounts in Utah, no employees or
otherwise doing business in Utah is immaterial.

Rather, the

issue is whether the contacts it does have with Utah is
sufficient under Utah's Long-Arm Statute.
B*

Under Utah's Long-Arm Statute, Specific Personal
Jurisdiction Can Be Asserted Over Laray.
The facts in the present case directly parallel the declared

purpose of Utah's Long-Arm Statute.

This purpose is stated as

follows:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that the public interest demands the
state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against non-residents, who, through certain
significant minimal context with this state, incur
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed
necessary because of technological progress which has
substantially increased the flow of commerce between
the several states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other
states.
Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-22 (1953, as amended).

The protection

intended under Utah's Long-Arm Statute is the protection sought
by Kamdar & Co. in the present case.

In the present case, Laray,

a California company, came to Utah and contracted with Kamdar &
5

Co., a Utah company, for its accounting services, based on the
technological advances making such a use more cost effective.
Now, Laray has refused to pay for these very same services.
Utah's Long-Arm Statute was intended to protect Utah citizens
from this type of abuse.

In these situations, the Utah courts

have given themselves jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed
by the due process of law.
378, 380 (Utah 1980).
seeks.

See Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d

It is this protection that Kamdar & Co.

It is this type of protection that the statute was meant

to offer.

It is this type of protection that this Court is

allowed to provide.
C.

All Requirements Are Met To Establish That The Utah Courts
Have Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Laray.
As previously discussed in appellant's opening brief, each

element to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Laray is
met.

First, Laray's contracting with Kamdar & Co., a Utah

company, for services to be performed within Utah during 1987 and
1988 falls squarely within the scope of § 78-27-24(1) of the Utah
Code2.
2

Utah's Long-Arm Statute gives further assistance in
determining what conduct constitutes the transaction of business
within the state by defining the term "transaction of business
within the state and to" in § 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code.
Pursuant to §78-27-23(2) the transaction of business within the
state requires conduct by the nonresident that affects persons or
businesses in the state. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co. .
701 P.2d 1106,1110 (Utah 1985); Nova Mudd Corp. v. Fletcher, 648
6

In the present case, Laray contracted in 1987 and 1988 to
have its accounting services rendered in Utah by Kamdar & Co.
Laray also communicated by telephone and mail with Kamdar & Co.
enabling Kamdar & Co. to perform the requested services.

Laray

also sent or had delivered to Utah all the materials necessary to
have the work accomplished in Utah3.

Such conduct satisfies this

first element.
The second requirement that the cause of action must arise
from the contact is indisputably met.

Laray's contact in Utah is

its contracts with Kamdar & Co. to do its accounting work.

The

instant dispute is over these very services.
The final element under a specific personal jurisdiction
analysis is that hailing the non-resident party into the forum
F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986).
3

By analogy, the contacts would have been no more significant
if Laray, for example, had been a manufacturer of steel and sent
steel bars to Kamdar & Co. to fabricate into bumpers and then send
the completed bumpers back to Laray in California to sell. Under
this scenario, Laray would send all needed raw materials for Kamdar
& Co. to accomplish its service of creating bumpers which Kamdar &
Co. takes and preforms its contractual duties for the benefit of
Laray.
The same nature of contact is found in the present case
wherein Laray sends its raw financial tax and financial information
to Kamdar & Co. to produce finished returns, reports, comparisons,
etc. These finished documents were then sent back to Laray for the
purpose of meeting its business objectives. While the fabrication
of bumpers might facially appear to give more credence to the
finding of sufficient contacts, the same quality of contacts are
found in the present case for the contracting of accounting
services.
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state does not offend notions of fair play and substantial
justice.

This element is also satisfied.

In the present case,

Laray made a conscious decision each year to employ Kamdar & Co.
to perform its accounting services in Utah.

Laray extended

itself to the privileges of the State of Utah by employing a Utah
company to do their work on a yearly basis.

Its failure to pay

for these services contracted for in Utah would be governed by
Utah law.

Its failure to pay for these services will require the

factual determination as to the value of these services based
upon the records kept and currently located in Utah.

Their

failure to pay for these services will require the testimony of
those who performed the services, all of which are located in
Utah.

In sum, the instant dispute arises from services

contracted for and performed in Utah.

Justice dictates that

Laray having availed itself of the privileges of contracting for
services to be performed in Utah should also be subjected to
account in Utah for its failure to pay for these services.

III.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Kamdar & Co.
respectfully requests the District Courtfs ruling should be
reversed and that specific personal jurisdiction should be
asserted against Laray Co., James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond
8

Boal for their failure to pay for accounting services contracted
and performed in Utah by Kamdar & Co. during 1987 and 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17,\'

day of February, 1991.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

BY.
Je^i-fe^ N": Walker
150,oA First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Appellant
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the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to the following:
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